Abstract A general structure of the Welch-Gong (WG) stream cipher family is based on filtering an m-sequence of degree l over a finite field F 2 m where the filtering function is a WG transformation from F 2 m to F 2 . For a fixed m and l, the linear span of the filtering sequence can be enhanced by increasing the algebraic degree of the WG transformations. This can be accomplished by the composition of a WG transformation with a monomial permutation, which is called the decimation of a WG transformation. In this paper, we first present the new exponent set of WG transformations, and show the existence of exponents derived from the new exponent set for which a decimated WG transformation achieves the maximum algebraic degree. As a result, the linear span of keystreams produced by a decimated WG cipher can be maximized and calculated theoretically. We then give a description of a decimated WG stream cipher which is built upon an LFSR and a decimated WG transformation over an extension field. The randomness properties of keystreams produced by a decimated WG cipher are derived based on the new exponent set. We also discuss the selection criteria for choosing the optimal parameters for the WG cipher family in order to achieve the maximum level of security. Finally, we present the optimal parameters for the WG transformations over F 2 m , 7 ≤ m ≤ 16 based on the proposed criteria.
Introduction
The WG stream cipher family is a set of hardware-oriented synchronous stream ciphers based on the Welch-Gong (WG) transformations, which consists of the WG stream ciphers and their decimated variants. A WG cipher is composed of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) over an extension field, followed by a WG transformation defined over the same extension field, where the LFSR with a primitive polynomial is able to generate a maximum length sequence (m-sequence) over the extension field and the m-sequence is filtered by the WG transformation to produce a binary sequence. The WG stream cipher family can be regarded as nonlinear filtering generators that output one keystream bit per clock cycle. In particular, the generated keystreams of the WG cipher family have the desired randomness properties such as long period, balanced, 2-level autocorrelation, and t-tuple distributions. Moreover, the linear complexity of a keystream produced by a WG cipher is high and can be determined exactly.
The WG stream cipher, first proposed by Nawaz and Gong in 2005, is a profile 2 candidate of the eSTREAM project [6, 16] . Later on, two lightweight variants of the WG stream cipher named WG-7 [13] and WG-8 [7] have been proposed for securing resource-constraint smart devices. While the WG-7 stream cipher is composed of an LFSR of length 23 and a WG-7 transformation over F 2 7 , the WG-8 stream cipher consists an LFSR of length 20 and a WG transformation over F 2 8 . Both WG-7 and WG-8 stream ciphers have a key of length 80 bits and an IV of length 81 and 80 bits, respectively. Recently, Fan and Gong proposed WG-16 stream cipher based confidentiality and integrity algorithm for 4G-LTE applications [8] , which intents to overcome the weaknesses of SNOW 3G and ZUC based integrity algorithms [20] .
The security of a (decimated) WG cipher is dependent on the length of the LFSR and the cryptographic strength of the WG transformation used in the cipher. As a result, the known cryptanalytic attacks such as correlation attacks [15, 19] , algebraic attacks [3] , cube attacks [5] , discrete fourier transformation (DFT) attacks [12] , distinguishing attacks [10, 18] , differential attacks [21] , and time-memory-data tradeoff attacks [2] can be applied to the WG stream cipher family. Therefore, the selection of the parameters for a (decimated) WG cipher is crucial in order to thwart existing attacks.
As we mentioned, a general structure of the WG stream cipher family is based on filtering an m-sequence over F 2 m of degree l where the filtering function is a WG transformation from F 2 m to F 2 . For a fixed m and l, the linear span can be increased by increasing the algebraic degree of the WG transformation, which is accomplished by performing a composition of a WG transformation with a monomial permutation.
Contributions Our paper first determines the new exponent set of WG transformations and then shows the existence of decimation numbers, which are invertible, for which the maximum algebraic degree of a decimated WG transformation is achievable. Moreover, knowing the exponent set explicitly, all the decimation numbers for which a decimated WG transformation obtains the maximum degree can be determined. We give a mathematical description of the decimated WG stream ciphers, including its operation as well as the randomness properties of the keystreams produced by a decimated WG cipher. For the decimation numbers obtained from the invertible exponents in the new exponent set, we give a lower bound on the linear span of a keystream produced by a decimated WG cipher. However, the exact linear span can be computed from the decimated exponent set. We discuss the criteria on selecting the optimal parameters for the WG cipher family in order to achieve the highest security against exiting generic passive attacks such as algebraic attacks, DFT attacks and distinguishing attacks. Finally, we summarize the optimal parameters for the WG transformations over F 2 m , 7 ≤ m ≤ 16.
Preliminaries

Description of WG transformations and WG permutations
Let F 2 be the Galois field with two elements and F 2 m = GF(2 m ) be an extension field with 2 m elements. Assume that m ≡ 0 (mod 3) and k is a positive integer such
over F 2 m where q i 's are given by
Then, the Welch-Gong (WG) transformation is defined by [17] 
where Tr(x) = x + x 2 + · · · + x 2 m−1 is the trace function mapping from F 2 m to F 2 .
Let m ≡ 0 (mod 3) and k be a positive integer such that 3k
A WG permutation, denoted by WGperm(x), is a permutation over F 2 m , whereas a WG transformation, denoted by WG(x), is a function from F 2 n to F 2 . The functions WGperm(x) and WG(x) are defined as
where I is the set consisting of exponents that belong to distinct cyclotomic cosets modulo 2 m − 1. Note that r i 's are computed by the rules given in [4] for making t(x) a permutation, and the exponents r i 's are different from the exponents q i 's in (1) which are taken from [17] . In general, the function u(x) in Section 2.1 is not a permutation. However, WG(x) is identical for both representations. The known results on the representation of WG transformations are summarized in Fact 1. 
Definition 1
Once the exponent set I is known, the exponent set for a decimate WG transformation WG(x d ) can be determined by multiplying each exponent in I by d where
The resultant exponent set is called a decimated exponent set.
Cryptographic properties of WG transformations
For odd m's, it is known that WG(x) has the following cryptographic properties (see [11] ). n − 1 where n = ml. Note that the WG cipher family is defined over F 2 m for m ≡ 0 (mod 3) as a WG transformation exists only if m ≡ 0 (mod 3). During the initialization phase, the cipher is executed for 2l clock cycles with the feedback signal Init. When the cipher goes into the running phase, the only feedback is within the LFSR and one keystream bit is generated per clock cycle. We denote a WG cipher/generator with an LFSR of l stages over F 2 m as a WG(m, l) generator. We denote by {a k } k≥0 the LFSR sequence over F 2 m and {s k } k≥0 the output sequence or keystream over F 2 . The mathematical expressions of updating the LFSR internal state and the output sequence of the WG(m, l) generator are given by
where WGperm(x) and WG(x) denote the WG permutation and WG transformation, respectively, as defined in Section 2.1. It is known that an output sequence or keystream of a WG(m, l) generator has the following randomness properties.
Proposition 1 [9]
For a WG(m, l) generator, an output sequence/keystream has the following randomness properties. WG(m,l) , increases exponentially in m, which can be determined exactly as
) It has an ideal 2-level autocorrelation property. (d) Any t-tuple is equally likely distributed (ideal t-tuple distribution) (1 ≤ t ≤ l). (e) Linear span or linear complexity, denoted by LS
LS WG(m,l) = m i∈I l H(i) ,
where H(i) is the Hamming weight of integer i.
Mathematical background
In this section, we define and describe some terms that will be used throughout this work.
Nonlinearity of Boolean functions and vector Boolean functions
Let F n 2 a vector space with 2 m elements and each element is of m-tuple. Let f (x 0 , · · · , x n−1 ) be a Boolean function in n variables. The Hadamard (or Walsh or Fourier) transform of f is defined bŷ
w i x i , the inner product of w and x. The distance between two binary vectors a = (a 0 , · · · , a n−1 ) and
, is defined as the number of disagreements of terms of a and b, i.e.,
where H(x) is the Hamming weight of x.
The nonlinearity of f , denoted as N f , is defined by the minimum distance between f and all affine functions. In other words,
where f i 's are Boolean functions in n variables.
The nonlinearity of F, denoted as N F , is defined by
where b · F is the inner product. Or equivalently,
Resiliency and propagation of Boolean functions
Let f be a Boolean function in n variables. The additive autocorrelation of f is defined as
Algebraic immunity of Boolean functions
Let B n be the set consisting of all Boolean functions in n variables. The algebraic immunity of f in n variables, denoted by AI( f ), is defined as
where deg(g) is the algebraic degree of g and f · g is the multiplication of two Boolean functions f and g. For a Boolean function f in n variables, the maximum value of the algebraic immunity is equal to n 2 . The linear span or linear complexity of a sequence is defined as the length of the shortest LFSR that generates the sequence [1, 14] .
New exponent set and algebraic degree of WG transformations
In this section, we investigate how to determine the set I in (3) in the case of 3k ≡ 1 (mod m). Based on the set I, we compute the algebraic degree of the Boolean form as well as the linear span of a WG transformation, and show that the algebraic degree and linear span are the same as those presented in [11] . Moreover, we show the existence of a decimation number for which the maximum algebraic degree of a decimated WG transformation is achievable and such a decimation number can be used in a decimated WG cipher to increase the cipher's strength.
New exponent sets of WG transformations
When k in WG(x) is computed from the equation m = 3k − 1 or m = 3k − 2, the exponent sets I's have been discovered in Fact 1. We now determine the new exponent sets I's in Theorems 1 and 2 when k is chosen as 3k ≡ 1 (mod m) for m ≡ 2 (mod 3) and m ≡ 1 (mod 3), respectively. Note that for m ≡ 1 (mod 3) and m ≡ 2 (mod 3), we have 2m = 3k − 1 and m = 3k − 1 for some positive integer k, respectively. These facts are extensively used in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 below. WG(x) in Theorems 1 and 2 is an alternative representation of WG transformations when WGperm(x) is a permutation over F 2 m .
Theorem 1 Let k be a positive integer such that
where
Proof After expansion, the first three terms of t(x + 1) + 1 can be written as
Combining (5)- (7), we obtain
Theorem 2 Let k be a positive integer such that 3k ≡ 1 (mod m) and m ≡ 1 (mod 3). Then
Proof 
2 + 2i + 1 and we denote by P and Q the set of P(i)'s and Q(i)'s, respectively. Note that all Q(i)'s are odd and P(i)'s might be odd or even and some exponents belong to both P and Q. We then apply the following transformation
) iteration, 2 k−1− j odd exponents will be canceled out from P and Q as they occur in both P and Q and after cancellation P(i) is set to be
. In the first iteration (i.e., j = 1), only 2 k−2 − 1 elements will be canceled out from P(i) and Q(i). Then, after simplification, (10) can be written as WG(x) = Tr(t(x + 1) + 1)
Hence the result is established. 2 ). However, after applying the trace equivalence with coset leaders, the old exponent sets and new exponent sets are the same.
In both cases m ≡ 1 (mod 3) and m ≡ 1 (mod 3), the total number of exponents in I is equal to (2 Property 1 Let WG(x) be the WG transformation defined by (9) , then the algebraic degree of WG(x), denoted as deg(WG(x)), is given by
Proof It is known that the algebraic degree of WG(x) is determined by the largest Hamming weight of the exponents in (9) .
+ 1 is the maximum Hamming weight among all exponents in I and for m ≡ 1 (mod 3). Thus, the algebraic degree of WG(x) is equal to k+1 2
Theorem 3 Let WG(x) be the WG transformation def ined by (9), then the linear span of WG(x), denoted as LS(WG(x)), is given by LS(WG(x))
Proof The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3 in [11] .
Existence of decimation for the maximum algebraic degree
Before proving the main result in Theorem 5, we first prove the existence of an invertible exponent in the new exponent set that helps to obtain a decimation number for the maximum degree in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Let WG(x) = i∈I
Tr(x i ) be the WG transformation def ined by (3) . Then there exists at least one exponent j ∈ I such that j is coprime with 2 m − 1.
Proof We observe that for m ≡ 2 (mod 3), j = r = 2 2k + 3 and for m ≡ 1 (mod 3),
always exist in the exponent set I. To prove the result, we only need to show that gcd(r, 2 m − 1) = 1 as the exponent s = 2 k+1 2 is coprime to 2 m − 1. We have
We now need to show that gcd(2 k+1 − 9, 31) = 1. It can be easily checked that 31
This completes the proof. 
by modulo (2 m − 1), can be used to achieve the maximum Hamming weight (m − 1) in the decimated exponent set I. As the maximum Hamming weight of the exponents in the decimated exponent set determines the algebraic degree of WG(x d ), the algebraic degree of WG(x d ) achieves the maximum value (m − 1).
3.3
Achieving maximum degree using the new exponent set Theorems 4 and 5 showed the existence of a decimation number for which the maximum degree of a decimated WG transformation is achievable. We now show how to obtain all the decimation numbers from the exponent set I for which the maximum degree is achievable. We construct the set W from I as
The set W contains all decimation numbers d's for which the maximum algebraic degree of WG(x d ) is achieved. To obtain all the decimation numbers for a fixed m, we first calculate the set I using Theorem 1 or 2, and then take the exponents in I which are coprime with (2 m − 1). Finally we form the set W from the invertible exponents. We note that the set I is obtained in a constructive way, but checking the greatest common divisor between an exponent in I and 2 m − 1 involves computations. In other words, we cannot find all exponents in I which are coprime with (2 m − 1) theoretically.
Linear span of the decimated WG stream cipher
In this section, we first describe a decimated WG stream cipher and then present the randomness properties of the keystreams generated by a decimated WG stream cipher, especially the linear span of a decimated WG cipher. We note that the WG stream cipher family consists of the WG ciphers as well as their decimated variants. Following the notation used in Section 2.3, the internal state of a WG d (m, l) cipher is updated and the output sequence is obtained as follows.
Remark 2 WG-7 [13] and WG-8 [7] stream ciphers used the decimation technique to increase the linear span of their keystreams.
According to Theorem 8.4 and Proposition 8.7 in [9] , a decimated WG d (m, l) has the same randomness properties as those listed in Proposition 1 except for the linear span. Furthermore, we have the following randomness properties for a keystream produced by a decimated WG cipher. 1, and the linear span of a WG d (m, l) keystream is given by
Proposition 2 The decimated WG d (m, l) has the same randomness properties (a)-(d) as described in Proposition
LS WGd (m,l) = m i∈I l H(d·i) (11) where (d · i) is reduced by modulo 2 m − 1. Furthermore, the algebraic degree of WG(x d ) is determined by deg WG(x d ) = max i∈I H(d · i).
Lower bound of linear span for optimal decimation
For the resistance against algebraic attacks, the decimated WG transformation used in the cipher should have high algebraic degree and high algebraic immunity when the LFSR is fixed, as the complexity of the algebraic attack is determined by the degree of the filtering function. Moreover, the linear span of a keystream is dependent on the algebraic degree of the WG transformation. Thus, to have the maximum linear span of a keystream and the maximum resistance against the algebraic attack, a decimated WG transformation should have the maximum algebraic degree.
Definition 3
The decimation d such that WG(x d ) has maximum algebraic degree and maximum algebraic immunity is referred to as an optimal decimation.
Theorem 6 If WG d (m, l) has an optimal decimation d, the linear span is lower bounded by
The proof of the above theorem follows from (11) . In particular, for d =
, the linear span of a keystream produced by WG d (m, l) is lower bounded by ml m−1 . For all decimation numbers in the set W defined in Section 3.3, the lower bound on the linear span in Theorem 6 is attainable.
Remark 3 All optimal decimation numbers for a fixed m are not determined theoretically. Only the exponent set I for a WG transformation is obtained in a constructive manner, but finding the decimation numbers for the maximum degree of WG(x d ) and calculating the algebraic immunity of WG(x d ) involve an experiment. Note that there is no theoretical result on the algebraic immunity of a decimated WG transformation.
For a WG cipher WG(m, l), the linear span of a keystream is bounded below by ml m 3 +1 . On the other hand, the linear span of a keystream produced by a decimated WG cipher WG d (m, l) for an optimal decimation d is lower bounded by ml m−1 . Thus, for achieving the maximum value of linear span of a keystream, an optimal decimation number must be chosen.
Optimal parameters
In this section, we present the criteria of selecting an optimal decimation number for a decimated WG cipher. With an optimal decimation number, a decimated WG transformation has good cryptographic properties, thereby offering a maximum level of security. Moreover, some optimal decimation numbers are listed for WG transformations over F 2 m , 7 ≤ m ≤ 16. 
Parameter selection for resisting TMD tradeoff attacks
Time-Memory-Data (TMD) tradeoff attack is a generic attack on stream ciphers and the attack complexity depends on the length of the internal state of the stream cipher [2] . As a result, the attack can be applied to the WG stream cipher family and the complexity of the attack on a WG d (m, l) is lower bounded by O(2 m·l 2 ), which depends on the parameter m and l. Thus, the parameters m and l need to be chosen so that a decimated WG stream cipher is resistant to TMD tradeoff attacks. 
Experimental results on optimal decimations
We note that the cryptographic properties of WG(x d ) defined in Section 2.2 and the nonlinearity and differential k-uniform distribution of WGperm(x) and WGperm(x d ) for both odd and even m's are not known theoretically. Fortunately, we can check those properties by computation for 7 ≤ m < 30 in practice. Based on the above criteria, we calculate the algebraic degree, nonlinearity, algebraic immunity, Resi d , and A d for WG transformations with optimal decimations as well as the nonlinearity and differential k-uniform for WG permutations optimal decimations over the finite field F 2 m , 7 ≤ m ≤ 16, where the primitive polynomials given in Table  3 .5 of [9] are used to construct F 2 m . Our results are summarized in Tables 1 to 4 . The Hamming weights of optimal decimation numbers are taken into consideration for an efficient implementation of a WG d (m, l) cipher.
In order to obtain all the decimation numbers for which a decimated WG transformation has maximum degree, we first calculate the exponent set I for an m and then perform d = , reduced by modulo 2 m − 1, for all e ∈ I with gcd(e, 2 m − 1) = 1. For m = 14 and 16, the computation complexity of calculating the differential k-uniform and nonlinearity of WG permutation is 2 42 and 2 48 , respectively. Due to the high computational complexity, we cannot compute the nonlinearity and differential k-uniform of WG permutation for m = 14 and 16. Instead, we compute the upper and lower bounds, denoted by N u and N l , respectively, of the nonlinearities of the component functions of WG permutations in these cases, where we consider a WG permutation as an (m, m)-vectorial Boolean function.
Conclusion
In this paper, we first derived the new exponent set for WG transformations and showed the existence of decimation numbers for which a decimated WG transformation can achieve the maximum algebraic degree. As a result, a theoretical lower bound for the linear span of keystreams produced by a decimated WG cipher is established for optimal decimations. Then, we described the decimated WG stream cipher and derived the randomness properties of keystreams produced by a decimated WG cipher. Furthermore, we presented a set of selection criteria for choosing the parameters of a decimated WG stream cipher for offering the maximum level of security against existing attacks on stream ciphers. With the new exponent set, we can compute all the decimation numbers for which decimated WG transformations will have the maximum algebraic degree. Finally, we summarized some optimal parameters for decimated WG transformations over F 2 m , 7 ≤ m ≤ 16.
